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NOTES
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 1259: A LEGITIMATE
FOUNDATION FOR TAXING SHORT SALES AGAINST THE
BOX OR A MERE MAKEOVER?
"[B]ulls make money, bears make money, and hogs get slaugh-
tered."' That is the Wall Street gospel on investors who are mo-
tivated by greed. Gluttonous investors should heed its advice be-
cause Congress, through its enactment of the Taxpayer Relief
Act of 1997,2 has taken aim at the tax benefits once reaped by
engaging in short sale against the box transactions.' Investors
no longer will be able to enter into absolute hedges without rec-
ognition of capital gain; rather, they will be forced to recognize
capital gain on appreciated financial positions even if those posi-
tions are not sold. This latest attack on a specialized application
of short selling4 is merely an extension of a long running dis-
dain for this financial practice.
For centuries, governments have treated short sales with
varying degrees of contempt.5 In the United States, government
scrutiny of short selling dates back to World War I,6 but politi-
cians did not voice their disapproval of short selling until the
1. Lee A. Sheppard, Deconstructing Daschle's Constructive Sales Draft, 70 TAX
NOTES 498, 498 (1996).
2. Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (to be codified at scattered sections of
I.R.C.).
3. See I.R.C. § 1259 (West Supp. 1997). For another description and interpreta-
tion of newly passed section 1259, see William M. Paul, Constructive Sales Under
New Section 1259, 76 TAX NOTES 1467 (1997).
4. Short selling is a financial strategy under which an investor sells a security
he does not own. See Provost v. United States, 269 U.S. 443, 450-51 (1926); DuPont
v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 1317, 1326-27 (1938) (citing Farr v. Commissioner, 33
B.T.A. 557, 561 (1935)), af]fd, 110 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1940).
5. See J. EDWARD MEEKER, SHORT SELLING 106-19 (1932); Jonathan R. Macey et
al., Restrictions On Short Sales: An Analysis of the Uptick Rule and its Role in View
of the October 1987 Stock Market Crash, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 799, 801 (1989).
6. See MEEKER, supra note 5, at 122-23.
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stock market crashed in 1929. Consider Illinois Representative
Adolph Sabath's assessment of short selling activity: "'short sell-
ing'... is the greatest evil that has been permitted or sanc-
tioned by the Government that I know of."7 Fifty-eight years
later, in the wake of the 1987 stock market crash, this critical
attitude resurfaced.' Joseph Grundfest, then Commissioner of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, commented on the
possibility of heightened government regulation of short sales:
"'When you sell short, you are in a sense betting against the
team.'"' After the 1929 and 1987 crashes, investors attacked
short sales on the grounds that they facilitated the manipulation
of securities prices and aggravated market declines."
Recently, critics have renewed calls for intensified regulation
of short sales in reaction to the November 16, 1995 initial public
offering (IPO) of the Est6e Lauder Companies, Inc." Rather
than picking at the wound left by years of criticism regarding
short selling's alleged "demoralizing" effect, government regula-
tors now are attacking short sales from a different angle. The
focus of regulatory watchdogs has shifted to the tax advantages
enjoyed by investors using one version of these transactions:
short selling against the box. 2
Although many investors sell short against the box, 3 a vari-
7. Short Selling of Securities: Hearing on H.R. 4, H.R. 4604, H.R. 4638, H.R.
4639 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 72d Cong., pt. 1, at 7 (1932) .[here-
inafter 1932 Hearing] (statement of Representative Adolph Sabath).
8. See Macey et al., supra note 5, at 799.
9. David A. Vise, Are Short Sales on the Up & Up?: NYSE Suspects Violations,
but Can't Find Them, WASH. POST, May 8, 1988, at HI (quoting Joseph Grundfest,
Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission).
10. See Macey, supra note 5, at 799-804. But see 1932 Hearing, supra note 7, at
97 (statement of Richard Whitney, President, New York Stock Exchange) ("If there
had been no short selling of securities, I am confident that the stock exchange
would have been forced to close many months ago. It was the willingness of people
who had sold short at higher levels to buy when prices were breaking that helped
to maintain the markets."); MEEKER, supra note 5, at 101-02 (stating that short sell-
ing stabilizes price movements and therefore benefits the stock market).
11. See Tom Herman, White House Moves to Curb Techniques to Get Around Capi-
tal-Gains Taxes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 1996, at A2.
12. See id. ("The Clinton administration is taking aim at several popular tech-
niques used by investors to defer or even eliminate capital-gains taxes .... [Tihe
legislative initiative would eliminate 'selling short against the box' . . ").
13. Short selling against the box is a financial practice under which an investor
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ant of short selling that can defer or reduce tax liability, Est~e
Lauder Companies' 1995 IPO served as the impetus for the re-
structured assault on short sales.'4 Congress responded to the
manner and degree to which the Lauders used short selling to
effectuate their stock offering by passing tax legislation that
treats certain financial transactions as "constructive sales" so
long as those transactions function to lock in capital gain or loss
with respect to the security involved. 5 The new law, codified as
Internal Revenue Code section 1259, treats certain appreciated
financial positions as constructive sales and taxes the capital
gains on those positions. 6 This Note contends that section 1259
is flawed. Fundamentally, section 1259 does not address directly
the true abusive practices involved in the Lauder transac-
tion-the ability to sell short against the box indefinitely with-
out any possibility of being squeezed;' 7 the opportunity to ob-
tain the proceeds from the short sale against the box before the
sells short a security that is already owned. See id.
14. See William J. Goldberg & Mark T. Watson, Short Sales Against the Box: An
Endangered Income Tax Planning Technique, 27 TAX ADVISER 345, 345 (1996); David
L. Evans et al., New York Accountants Oppose Short-Against-the-Box-Proposal, TAX
NOTES TODAY 54-112, Mar. 18, 1996, at T 24-26, available in WESTLAW, TNT
Database; L.G. "Chip" Harter, Proposed Section 1259: Targeting "Shorts Against the
Box" and What Else?, 37 Tax Mgmt. (BNA) S-121, S-121-22 (May 27, 1996); Rob
Marvin, Practitioners Pleased Administration's New Anti-Deferral Proposal Not Broad-
er, [1996] Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) G-3, G-3 (Jan. 17, 1996); Rob Marvin, Relief Offered
for Financial Instruments Subject to Some Administration Proposals, [1995] Daily
Tax Rep. (BNA) G-3, G-4 (Dec. 12, 1995); Diana B. Henriques & Floyd Norris,
Wealthy, Helped by Wall St., Find New Ways to Escape Tax on Profits, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 1, 1996, at Al; Herman, supra note 11, at A2; Allan Sloan, Lauder Family's
Stock Maneuvers Could Make a Tax Accountant Blush, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 1995,
at D3.
15. See I.R.C. § 1259 (West Supp. 1997). "Security" as used in this Note refers to
publicly traded stock and certain forms of indebtedness. Note that the term "finan-
cial instruments" discussed hereafter applies to many types of securities, not only
stock. Section 1259, however, targets stocks, debt instruments, and partnership inter-
ests only. See id.
16. See id.
17. The term "squeezed" refers to a scenario in which the short seller is forced to
deliver the borrowed securities before desired because the lender makes demand. See
Telephone Interview with Sarkes Missakian, Vice President of Investments, Pruden-
tial Securities Inc. (May 6, 1997) [hereinafter Missakian Interview]. As a result of
this squeeze risk, the short seller faces possible losses or limited capital gains on
the transaction. See id.
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transaction is closed; 8 and, finally, the combination of Revenue
Ruling 72-478's and section 1014 of the Internal Revenue Code
("the Code"). 20 Rather, section 1259 creates an inequitable stan-
dard that is both contrary to longstanding tax doctrine and det-
rimental to legitimate investment decisions.
This Note is divided into six parts. The first part explains the
principal financial instruments affected by section 1259: short
sales against the box and total return equity swaps. The second
part traces Est6e Lauder Companies' November 16, 1995 IPO
and uses that transaction as a case study to flesh out the abuses
with which section 1259 should be concerned. The third part
outlines the prior tax law as it applied to short sales against the
box, highlights the pertinent requirements of section 1259, and
discusses section 1259's purpose. The fourth part documents the
shortcomings of section 1259. The fifth part suggests alternative
proposals that Congress might have considered. Finally, the
sixth part offers a paradigm, the Related Individual-Income
With Respect to a Decedent Rule, that more appropriately ad-
dresses and alleviates the abuses that can occur when particu-
lar investors sell short against the box.
THE AFFECTED FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
Short Sales Against the Box
To understand short sales against the box, familiarity with
the practice of short selling is necessary.2 "The term short sale
means any sale of a security which the seller does not own or
any sale which is consummated by the delivery of a security bor-
rowed by, or for the account of, the seller."22 At some point in
18. See infra note 34 and accompanying text for an explanation of the term "closed."
19. Rev. Rul. 72-478, 1972-2 C.B. 487.
20. I.R.C. § 1014 (1988 & West Supp. 1997).
21. For a more complete discourse on short selling, see MEEKER, supra note 5,
and HENRY D. SCHULTZ, BEAR MARKET INVESTMENT STRATEGIES 141-55 (1981).
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-3 (1997); see also Provost v. United States, 269 U.S. 443,
451 (1926) (stating that a short sale occurs when an investor contracts to sell a se-
curity that he "does not own or the certificates for which are not within his control
so as to be available for delivery at the time when, under the rules of the Ex-
change, delivery must be made").
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the future, the short seller returns the borrowed security to the
lender with an identical security purchased in the market.' A
short sale, therefore, involves three brokers: the selling broker
who represents the customer selling short, the buying broker
who represents the investor purchasing the security sold short,
and the lending broker who represents the account lending the
securities to the selling broker.
Mechanically, the selling broker borrows the security from the
lending broker and then sells the same security to the buying
broker.' In exchange for the loan of the security, the lending
broker receives full protection from the selling broker in the
form of a check equal to the fair market value of the loaned
security.26 The short seller, furthermore, must "mark to the
market" whenever the price of the shorted security rises.1 In
other words, the loan of the security must be protected at 100%
of its fair market value, meaning that the short seller must
make cash deposits with the lending broker to the degree that
cash reserves are equal to the market value of the borrowed
security." A collateralization system is necessary to ensure
that the security will be returned to the accounts from which the
security was borrowed when the owners of those accounts de-
mand delivery.2 A more salient point with respect to this Note
is the fact that the proceeds from short sales against the box
cannot be used by the average short seller."0 Rather, the pro-
23. See 1997 TAX FACTS 2: ON INVESTMENTS 14 (Deborah A. Miner et al. eds.,
1997).
24. See WiLLi H. RUBIN & ANTHONY J. GAmBARO, FUNDAAMENTALS OF MARGIN
TRADING 140 (1969). Fewer than three brokers may be used if one of the brokers
assumes more than one function. Cf ick (noting that three brokers are involved "in
theory").
25. See id. At this point, the buying broker is out of the picture. See id.
26. See id. In the case of a short sale against the box, the borrower deposits the
appreciated security, the security in the box, with the lending broker to serve as
additional collateral. See John R. Wilson & Patrick A. Jackman, Using Derivatives to
Have Your Cake and Eat It, Too, 24 COLO. LAW. 2213, 2214 (1995). Typically, the
borrower receives interest that is derived from the market value of the security in
the box. See id. These interest payments continue until the short sale against the
box is closed. See id.
27. RUBIN & GAMBARO, supra note 24, at 161, 164.
28. See id. at 161.
29. See Missakian Interview, supra note 17.
30. See RUBIN & GAMtBARO, supra note 24, at 147; Henriques & Norris, supra
1998] 1359
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ceeds are transferred to the lending broker who holds the pro-
ceeds in an interest bearing account as collateral for the bor-
rowed shares."' Wealthy short sellers with large accounts, how-
ever, may obtain the proceeds by taking out a loan from the sell-
ing-broker 2 for up to ninety-five percent of the value of the se-
curity sold short.33
In addition to transaction costs and a premium paid to the
lender for the right to borrow the security, the short seller must
reimburse the lender for all dividends declared to the stockhold-
ers of record while the short sale remains open.34 Such pay-
ment is required because the lender transfers only the physical
certificate to the short seller, thereby retaining all of his share-
holder rights.35 The short seller does not collect the dividend
paid out to the borrowed shares but instead adjusts his financial
position to reflect the dividend payment. 6
note 14, at Al.
31. See Wilson & Jackman, supra note 26, at 2214. The collateral discussed is the
same referred to supra text accompanying note 29.
32. See Henriques & Norris, supra note 14, at A45; Missakian Interview, supra
note 17.
33. See Daniel Shefter, Tax Proposals on 'Short Against the Box' and Other Hedg-
ing Transactions, 70 TAX NOTES 581, 584 (1996); Wilson & Jackman, supra note 26,
at 2214. Consequently, the typical investor who sells short against the box does not
receive the equivalent of what he would have received had he closed out his long
position. Rather, only wealthy investors with large accounts can get the proceeds by
taking out a loan, at extremely favorable rates, that requires interest payments and
repayment. See Missakian Interview, supra note 17. The assumption that the Laud-
ers did receive the proceeds raises another interesting potential abuse of short sell-
ing against the box. Although perfectly legal, the fact that the Lauders might have
been able to obtain the proceeds distances their activities from those of the average
investor, thereby raising questions regarding equitable treatment. See infra notes
119-23 and accompanying text.
34. See 1997 TAx FACTS 2: ON INVESTMENTS, supra note 23, at 14; RUBIN &
GAMBARO, supra note 24, at 164-65. The short sale remains open until the short
seller returns to the lender a security identical to the one borrowed. See 1997 TAX
FACTS 2: ON INVESTMENTS, supra note 23, at 14. At that time, the short sale is said
to be closed. See id.
35. See RUBIN & GAMBARO, supra note 24, at 164.
36. See id. at 165. In effect, the buying broker has reregistered the purchased
security in his customer's name. See id. at 164. All dividends declared, thus, are col-
lected by that investor. See id. Logically, however, the lender should be reimbursed
for the foregone dividends that he would have collected had the loan never occurred.
See id. at 164-65. As a result, the short seller must adjust his position to compen-
sate the lender. See id. at 165. Consider the following example: A short seller bor-
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A short sale against the box is mechanically identical to a
plain short sale with one important exception. When an investor
sells short against the box, he owns the security or a similar
marginable security being sold short but elects to borrow the
identical security from a third party rather than deliver the se-
curity he already owns (i.e., the security in "the box")." As a re-
sult, the investor creates both a long and a short position in the
same security, thereby hedging against any price fluctuations."8
The investor has removed all of the risk of loss and opportunity
for gain associated with the fluctuation in the security's market
price. 9 Short selling is motivated by speculation, hedging, and
tax planning. ° The primary incentives to short selling against
the box, though, are hedging and tax planning.4
rows 100 XYZ shares with a market value of $50. While the short remains open, a
100% dividend is declared. The short seller adjusts his or her position accordingly to
200 XYZ shares borrowed, thereby making up for the lost dividend. See id.
37. See 1997 TAX FACTS 2: ON INVESTMENTS, supra note 23, at 14.
38. See Shefter, supra note 33, at 583.
39. See Goldberg & Watson, supra note 14, at 345-46; Shefter, supra note 33, at 583.
40. See RUBIN & GAMBARO, supra note 24, at 143. Speculators enter into short
sales with the hope that the market will decline. See id. This decline will enable
them to purchase identical securities at a lower price than the price at which they
sold the borrowed securities. See id. The spread between the price sold and the price
purchased will be the short seller's gain or loss. See id. at 144. Investors who en-
gage in a short sale with the intent to hedge usually are long in a similar or iden-
tical security. See Missakian Interview, supra note 17. The hedger hopes to mini-
mize, or in the case of short selling against the box, remove the risk involved in
being long in a particular security. See id. The tax incentive involved is the central
issue of section 1259. See, e.g., Herman, supra note 11, at A2. Presently, the tax
laws do not acknowledge realization of capital gain or loss on a short sale until the
short is closed. See I.R.C. § 1233(b) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.1233-1(a)(1) (as amended
in 1980); see also DuPont v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 641, 642-43 (3d Cir. 1940)
(stating that a capital gain or loss is recognized upon closure of a short sale). The
investor, therefore, may defer gains or losses to a future date when he or she has
offsetting gains or losses or the capital gains rates are more favorable. See
Missakian Interview, supra note 17. Because the typical short seller does not have
complete control over the time when the sale will be closed, this motive is mislead-
ing. See id. In other words a squeeze might occur to force the typical short seller to
close the short position. See id&; cf Wilson & Jackman, supra note 26, at 2214 (stat-
ing that the lending broker has the right to demand that the short sale be closed to
protect itself against loss).
41. See RUBIN & GAMBARO, supra note 24, at 154; Shefter, supra note 33, at 583.
Speculation is removed as a motive because the short seller is long in an equivalent
amount of the borrowed security and thus cannot realize any additional capital gain
from the short sale. See Missakian Interview, supra note 17. For an excellent discus-
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For example, assume an investor owns 100 shares of XYZ stock
with a cost basis of $100 per share and a current market value of
$150 per share. Instead of selling the XYZ stock in the market,
perhaps motivated by a desire not to create a taxable event, the
investor can instruct his broker, the selling broker, to borrow 100
shares of XYZ from a third party, the lending broker, and then
sell the borrowed shares short in the market.42 The $15,000 in
proceeds would then be deposited with the lending broker who, in
turn, would place the proceeds in an interest bearing account.4"
Next, the investor, perhaps because he or she wishes to become
more liquid, could take out a loan from the selling broker that is
valued at no more than $14,250." At some future date, the short
seller will return the borrowed stock, repay the loan, and receive
$5,000 in capital gain, the difference between the value of the
shorted stock ($15,000) and the cost basis of the investor's origi-
nal shares ($10,000). 4" Under prior tax law, recognition of the
$5,000 capital gain occurred at this time.46
Total Return Equity Swaps
Although referred to as short sales against the box legisla-
tion,47 section 1259 reaches beyond this one financial instru-
ment and also affects certain derivative instruments. Derivatives
are financial products that derive their value from the value of
some underlying asset.48 The value of derivatives fluctuates in
sion of the tax consequences of short sales against the box, see Edward D.
Kleinbard, Risky and Riskless Positions in Securities, 71 TAXES 783 (1993).
42. At this point, the short seller has hedged his long position.
43. See supra text accompanying note 31.
44. Ninety-five percent of the value of the shares sold short-the maximum per-
missible loan. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
45. See Shefter, supra note 33, at 583-84.
46. See id.
47. See Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Comments on
"Short Against the Box" Proposal, Treasury News, Jan. 12, 1996, reprinted in
Shelter, supra note 33, at 587.
48. See Joseph L. Motes III, Comment, A Primer on the Trade and Regulation of
Derivative Instruments, 49 SMU L. REv. 579, 583 (1996). For more information on
the regulatory framework faced by derivative instruments, see Roberta Romano, A
Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55 MD. L. REV. 1
(1996).
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reaction to changes in the underlying asset's value.49 As a re-
sult, derivatives are attractive instruments to investors who
wish to hedge their risk and to others who want to speculate in
the financial markets." The principal type of derivative instru-
ment affected by section 1259 is called a notional principal con-
tract or swap.
"A swap is a [forward] contract between two parties... to
exchange a series of cash flows over time."51 The various types
of swaps are distinguished by looking at the definitions of peri-
odic cash flows, i.e., whether the payments consist of different
rates of return within one currency or different currencies.52
Items that may be swapped include returns on equity, interest
rates, and currencies." Similar to short sales against the box,
the motivations to enter into swap arrangements include specu-
lation, hedging, and tax advantages." The swap arrangements
affected most by section 1259 are total return equity swaps."
49. See Motes, supra note 48, at 583.
50. See id. (citing Saul Hansell & Kevin Muebring, Why Derivatives Rattle the
Regulators, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 1992, at 49, 50). Essentially, a derivative
functions as a bet between two parties with respect to the value of some asset that,
in turn, is affected by the direction of the market. See id.
51. Romano, supra note 48; at 46; see Gunter Dufey & Taeyoung Chung, Interna-
tional Financial Markets: A Survey, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND INVESTING 3, 25-
26 (R.L. Kuhn ed., 1990); Motes, supra note 48, at 590. A "forward contract" is an
individualized agreement between two parties whereby one party agrees to buy and
the other party agrees to sell a particular asset or bundle of assets at some future
date. See id, at 588. Furthermore, both the price and quantity of the contract are
set at the time the contract is made. See id. Forward contracts, however, are not to
be confused with futures contracts, which are standardized and exchange-traded. See
id. For more information on this distinction, see RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C.
MYERS, PRiNCPLES OF CORPoRATE FINANCE 636-42 (4th ed. 1991).
52. The former description refers to interest rate swaps and the latter to currency
swaps. See Dufey & Chung, supra note 51, at 25-26.
53. See Romano, supra note 48, at 47-51; Lewis R. Steinberg, Selected Issues in
the Taxation of Swaps, Structured Finance and Other Financial Products, 1 FLA. TAX
REV. 263, 281 (1993); Motes, supra note 48, at 590-93.
54. Whether tax considerations continue to be a motivation to participate in equity
swaps is debatable given the fact that equity swaps are deemed straddles for tax
purposes. See I.R.C. § 1092(d)(3)(B) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.1092(d)-2 (1995); Evans et
al., supra note 14, 6; Shefter, supra note 33, at 584. A "straddle" means "offset-
ting positions with respect to personal property." I.R.C. § 1092(c)(1).
55. Cf Shefter, supra note 33, at 584 (noting that under the new law total return
equity swaps would be deemed constructive sales whereas the new law may not ap-
ply to other types of equity swaps).
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Total return equity swaps are forward contracts in which one
party agrees to trade the total return56 with respect to a partic-
ular security owned by that party for the total return on a differ-
ent security, equity index, or bundle of securities owned by a
second party, typically a broker.57 Due to the trade, each inves-
tor has eliminated his risk of loss and opportunity for gain in
the swapped security over the term of the swap
arrangement.58 For example, assume an investor owns 100
shares of XYZ, with a cost basis of $100 and a fair market value
of $150."9 In an attempt to hedge against the risk of a decrease
in the price of XYZ, and as an alternative to selling the stock
outright, the investor can enter into a three year total return
equity swap with a broker who holds ABC stock having a cost
basis of $100 and a fair market value of $120. In exchange for
paying the broker the following (1) dividends, if any, declared on
XYZ, (2) appreciation, if any, in the value of XYZ over the swap
period, and (3) depreciation, if any, in the value of ABC during
the term of the swap agreement, the investor shall receive from
the broker the following: (1) any dividends declared on ABC, (2)
any appreciation in the value of ABC, and (3) any depreciation
in the value of XYZ over the same swap period.60 The investor,
for a specified time period, has transferred his economic interest
in XYZ to the broker in return for the broker's economic interest
in ABC.6 Under prior tax law, the investor did not realize any
56. "Total return" refers to dividends and appreciation. See id.
57. See id. See generally Mary L. Harmon & Daniel P. Breen, The Changing
World of Equity Derivatives, in TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DIS-
POSITION'S SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS, AND
RESTRUCTURINGS 1996, at 935, 941 (PLI Tax Law & Practice Course Handbook Se-
ries No. J-393, 1996) (defining equity swaps).
58. See Shefter, supra note 33, at 584. Both the upside and downside potential of
the security are eliminated because the investor has swapped the security's returns
for the returns of some other security. See Missakian Interview, supra note 17.
59. Realistically, the amounts involved in this example will be much larger; the
small scale, however, provides for a more understandable explanation.
60. See Shefter, supra note 33, at 584.
61. See id. Unlike the stock for stock swap exemplified previously, investors fre-
quently seek to swap out of a single stock for the return on a bundle of stocks de-
riving their value from a stock index such as Standard & Poor's 500. See id. Alter-
natively, the investor can swap the total return on his or her equity position for a
return derived from an index such as the London Interbank Exchange Rate (LIBOR).
See Richard L. Reinhold, Tax Issues in Equity Swap Transactions, 57 TAX NOTES
1364
19981 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 1259 1365
capital gain or loss as a result of the swap, because the
transaction was not viewed as a sale but as an executory con-
tract in which the parties contracted to exchange a series of
future cash flows.62 Tax liability, therefore, was not incurred
until the sale of the swapped stock by its owner.
THE iMPETUS: THE ESTfE LAUDER COMPANmES' IPO
Estee Lauder Companies' November 16, 1995 IPOs served
as the driving force behind the enactment of section 1259. 4
Given the huge tax savings involved under prior law6" and
the IPO's apparent violation of the spirit of the tax laws,
Congress's response is easy to understand. To illustrate, con-
sider the transactions entered into by Estee Lauder and Ron-
ald Lauder, respectively.66
Estge Lauder
Using a trust entitled the "EL 1994 Trust" as her agent, Est~e
Lauder borrowed 5.5 million shares of Estee Lauder Companies
stock from her son, Leonard. Subsequently, as part of the
1185, 1186 (1992).
62. See Shefter, supra note 33, at 584; Steinberg, supra note 53, at 282-84.
63. THE ESTtE LAUDER COMPANIES INC., PROSPECTUs (1995).
64. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Although somewhat anomalous, the
Est~e Lauder Companies' IPO is not an isolated distortion of the short sale against
the box rules. Consider former U.S. citizen and multi-billionaire Justin Dart who
shorted over $300 million in Salomon Brothers Inc. stock against the box with the
likely intention of taking advantage of section 877 of the Code, which eliminates
U.S. tax liability for certain positions held open for more than ten years. See I.R.C.
§ 877(a)(1) (1994); Evans et al., supra note 14, It 21-23.
65. See Laura Jereski & Laura Bird, Beauty Secrets: Ronald Lauder's Debts and
Estge's Old Age Force a Firm Makeover, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1995, at Al; Sloan,
supra note 14, at D3.
66. In both of these transactions, assume the Lauders' cost basis in their long
positions equaled zero because they likely paid nothing for the closely held stock.
See Sloan, supra note 14, at D3. Further assumptions include: (1) the Lauders's
placement in the highest local, state, and federal income tax brackets, and (2) the
application of generally accepted short against the box mechanics. See id. Also note
that the description of the Lauders's plan is ex-ante. The current law, discussed be-
low, grandfathers in transactions such as the IPO in order to ensnare those "taxpay-
ers" who had open positions at the time of enactment. See infra note 105.
67. See THE EsTtE LAuDER COMPANIES INC., supra note 63, at 53, 55-56; Sloan,
supra note 14, at D3.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1355
IPO, the Trust sold these shares short against the box to the
public at an offering price of $26 per share.68 After accounting
for brokerage fees equaling $1.43 per share," Est6e received
$24.57 per share,"0 or approximately $135 million."'
Under prior tax law, selling borrowed stock did not generate
taxable income because realization did not occur until the short
seller returned the borrowed stock to the lender, thereby closing
the short sale.72 Estee, therefore, paid no capital gains taxes on
the "income" received in the year the sale was made, but rather,
recognition would occur upon completion of the short sale at
some future date.73 The question is whether Estee will return
the borrowed shares to Leonard before she died. Consider the
following: if Est6e dies before closing out the short sale, then her
estate could devise the 5.5 million shares held in the box to
Leonard.74 Due to the death loophole found in section 1014 of
the Code, Leonard would take the stock at a tax-free stepped-up
basis. 5 In turn, Leonard would close out the short sale himself
using the devised stock. The result: the cost basis on the stock
would be stepped-up to its fair market value on the date of the
deviser's death. 6 Consequently, no capital gain would be real-
ized on the stock.
68. See THE EST2E LAUDER COMPANIES INC., supra note 63, at 1; Sloan, supra
note 14, at D3.
69. See THE ESTtE LAUDER COMPANIES INC., supra note 63, at 1.
70. See id.; Sloan, supra note 14, at D3.
71. See Sloan, supra note 14, at D3. Recall that the proceeds from the typical
short sale against the box are not received by the short seller directly but are trans-
ferred to the lending broker to be held as collateral. See supra note 31 and accom-
panying text. Technically, $135 million dollars likely was generated in Estde's short
account before any of the proceeds reached Estee. See Missakian Interview, supra
note 17.
72. See I.R.C. § 1233(a) (1994); Doyle v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 654, 657 (7th
Cir. 1961); Bingham v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 186, 189-90 (1932); Rev. Rul 72-
478, 1972-2 C.B. 487; Treas. Reg. § 1.1233-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1980).
73. See Sloan, supra note 14, at D3.
74. See id.
75. See I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1) (1994). Section 1014 states that "the basis of property
in the hands of a person acquiring the property from a decedent ... shall ... be
(1) the fair market value of the property at the date of the decedents death." Id.
76. See Missakian Interview, supra note 17.
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Ronald Lauder
Like his mother, Ronald used the short against the box loop-
hole to perfection. He first borrowed approximately 8.33 million
shares from various family members, including his brother Leon-
ard.77 Subsequently, he sold that borrowed stock short against
the box to the public for $26 per share for a net total of about
$205 million.7 Under prior tax law, Ronald, like Est6e, would
not have paid any tax on the $205 million until he returned the
8.33 million shares to the lenders.79
Additionally, Ronald could have taken advantage of section
1014, i.e., he might have left the short position open for the re-
mainder of his life."0 In so doing, he would have passed on the
shares in the box, at a stepped-up basis, to the specified indi-
vidual."' As with Este Lauder, the result would have been that
no tax would be paid on the capital gain.
PRESIDENT CLINTON'S RESPONSE: SECTION 1259
On March 19, 1996, President Clinton released his Fiscal Year
1997 Budget Proposal, the supplement to which contained,
among other things, a proposal to amend the Internal Revenue
Code. 2 As part of the President's plan "to kill 'selling short
against the box' and similar strategies to lock in gains while
deferring or even eliminating taxes,"' Congress recently passed
this proposal, and the President signed it into law.' The Code,
77. See THE ESTtE LAUDER COMPANIES INC., supra note 63, at 53, 55; Sloan, su-
pra note 14, at D3.
78. See THE ESTtE LAUDER COMPANIES INC., supra note 63, at 1, 53; Sloan, supra
note 14, at D3. Again, the net amount is adjusted for underwriter fees of $1.43 per
share. See THE ESTE LAUDER COMPANIES INC., supra note 63, at 1.
79. See supra text accompanying note 72.
80. See Sloan, supra note 14, at D3.
81. See I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1) (1994).
82. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET
OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 1997 36, 39 (1996) [hereinafter
BUDGET]; Lee A. Sheppard & Sheryl Stratton, Proposed Business Tax Changes in
Administration's 1997 Budget, 70 TAX NOTES 1714, 1714 (1996).
83. Tax Report: A Securities-Industry Group Defends Investor Techniques Under
Assault, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 1997, at Al.
84. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1001, 111 Stat. 788,
903 (codified at I.R.C. § 1259 (West Supp. 1997)); Office of Fed. Tax Servs., Arthur
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as amended, includes section 1259, entitled "Constructive Sales
Treatment For Appreciated Financial Positions."' Section 1259
is a response to the short sale against the box transaction that
the Lauders used as part of Est6e Lauder Companies' IPO."6
Considering the potential tax revenues at stake-countless in-
vestors could have used this type of transaction-the
Administration's and Congress's concern was warranted.
Tax Implications of Short Sales Against the Box
Prior Law
Prior tax law did not recognize capital gain or loss until real-
ization occurred.' Additionally, a taxpayer did not realize capi-
tal gain or loss until a capital asset was sold or exchanged."
With respect to open transactions such as short sales against the
box, a taxpayer did not realize capital gain or loss until the tax-
payer returned the borrowed stock and closed the short posi-
tion. 9 As a result, taxpayers could lock in capital gain or loss
by entering into certain positions while deferring recognition
Anderson LLP, The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, 76 TAX NOTES 817, 817 (1997).
85. I.R.C. § 1259.
86. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Note that the administration pro-
posed further that the basis of substantially identical securities be determined on an
average cost basis. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, 1996 GENERAL EXPLANATIONS
OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S REVENUE PROPOSALS 70-71 (1996) [hereinafter TREASURY
EXPLANATION]. Although linked strongly to section 1259, the Average Cost Basis
Requirement is beyond the scope of this Note. Importantly, however, notice that
requiring the taxpayer to use an average cost basis method greatly reduces the
incentive to use short sales against the box as a short-term hedge. In other words,
prohibiting the investor from selecting the exact securities he or she wishes to deliv-
er and requiring that he or she use an average cost basis defeats the benefit of pur-
chasing securities in the market-with a higher cost basis than the securities in the
box-to close out the short position. For further discussion of the Average Cost Basis
Requirement, see id.
87. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1994). Realization occurs when the taxpayer sells or dis-
poses of taxable property. Cf id. § 1001(b) (stating that "It]he amount realized from
the sale or other disposition of property shall be the sum of any money received
plus the fair market value of the property (other than money) received").
88. See id. § 1222.
89. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. Swaps, options, and many other de-
rivative instruments are open transactions. See generally Wilson & Jackman, supra
note 26 (discussing the tax implications of swaps, options, and short sales against
the box).
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until some future date9 or, in some instances, avoid recognition
altogether. As indicated previously, section 1014 can be used to
avoid paying, or reduce greatly, taxes on capital gains altogeth-
er.91 When used in conjunction with the prior Code provisions
for open transactions, section 1014 created an enticing loophole
for investors holding concentrated equity positions.92 The trans-
action entered into by the Lauders demonstrates the lure of this
combination of tax provisions. Believing "[ilt is inappropriate for
taxpayers to be able to dispose of the economic risks and re-
wards of owning appreciated property without realizing income
for tax purposes,"" the Administration drafted legislation ex
post facto to prevent taxpayers from doing what the Lauders
did: eliminate risk of loss and opportunity for gain on the stock
sold short while being treated for tax purposes as if no disposi-
tion occurred.' In drafting section 1259, therefore, the Admin-
istration focused on investors who had the necessary amount of
capital or access to modern financial products to enable them to
lock in capital gain forever without any recognition. 5
Section 1259
In response to these concerns about how the Code applied to
certain open positions, the Administration issued a propos-
al-the precursor to section 1259-that would require taxpayers
to "recognize gain.., upon entering into a constructive sale of
any appreciated position in stock, a debt instrument, or a part-
nership interest."96 As enacted, section 1259 creates two provi-
sions: (1) the taxpayer must hold an appreciated financial posi-
tion and (2) that position must be constructively sold. 7 Section
1259 defines "appreciated financial positions" as "any position
90. See TREASURY EXPLANATION, supra note 86, at 72-73.
91. See I.R.C. § 1014; Sloan, supra note 14, at D3; supra notes 74-81 and accom-
panying text.
92. The Lauders possessed a concentrated equity position-their portfolio was con-
centrated heavily in one particular security.
93. See TREASURY EXPLANATION, supra note 86, at 72.
94. See id. at 72-73.
95. See id. at 72-74.
96. BUDGET, supra note 82, at 39; see TREASURY EXPLANATION, supra note 86, at 73.
97. See I.R.C. § 1259(a) (West Supp. 1997).
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with respect to any stock, debt instrument, or partnership inter-
est if there would be gain were such position sold, assigned, or
otherwise terminated at its fair market value.""5 Section
1259(c)(1) provides that a "constructive sale" of an appreciated
financial position occurs when the taxpayer
(A) enters into a short sale of the same or substantially
identical property,
(B) enters into an offsetting notional principal contract
with respect to the same or substantially identical property,
(C) enters into a futures or forward contract to deliver the
same or substantially identical property,
(D) in the case of an appreciated financial position that is
a short sale or a contract described in subparagraph (B) or
(C) with respect to any property, acquires the same or sub-
stantially identical property, or
(E) to the extent prescribed by the Secretary in regula-
tions, enters into [one] or more other transactions (or ac-
quires [one] or more positions) that have substantially the
same effect as a transaction described in any of the preceding
subparagraphs."5
The financial products specifically named in section 1259 include
short sales against the box, notional principle contracts, and cer-
tain futures and forwards contracts.0 0 Section 1259 defines a
"forward contract" as "a contract to deliver a substantially fixed
amount of property for a substantially fixed price"' and an
"offsetting notional principal contract" as "an agreement which
includes-(A) a requirement to pay.., all or substantially all of
the investment yield (including appreciation) on such property
for a specified period, and (B) a right to be reimbursed for...
all or substantially all of any decline in the value of such prop-
erty." ' 2 Section 1259, however, does exempt certain transac-
98. Id. § 1259(b)(1). Note, however, that exclusions are created for straight non-
convertible debt and certain other positions that are marked to market under the
Code. See id. § 1259(b)(2).
99. Id. § 1259(c)(1)(A)-(E).
100. See id.
101. Id. § 1259(d)(1).
102. Id. § 1259(d)(2). The total return equity swaps discussed previously clearly fall
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tions: If the transactions are closed within thirty days after the
end of the taxable year (January 30) and if the taxpayer holds
the appreciated position at risk for a sixty day period beginning
on the date the open position was closed.103 Section 1259 ap-
plies to constructive sale transactions entered into after June 8,
1997,' and for decedents dying after that effective date, a
special rule applies.0 5
CRrrICIsMs OF SECTION 1259
In critiquing section 1259, the Lauder family's exceptionally
abusive application of short selling against the box to the Est~e
Lauder Companies' IPO must be kept in mind. By remembering
the Administration's motivation, several legitimate grounds for
attacking section 1259 become more obvious.0 6 First, section
1259, rather than resulting in a fair application of the tax laws,
will lead to greater inequities between taxpayers. Second, the
concept of treating certain property as constructively sold, and
hence resulting in income, when in fact no "accessions to wealth,
clearly realized, and over which the taxpayerD [has] complete
dominion"0 7 have occurred is contrary to long-standing tax pol-
icy. Finally, the inflexible nature of section 1259 will limit the
benign practices of investors partially controlling the timing
when capital gains will be recognized, or using short selling
against the box as a hedging tool to protect against short-term
risks.
into this category. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
103. See I.R.C. § 1259(c)(3)(A)(i)-(iii).
104. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1001(d)(1), 111 Stat.
788, 907 (to be codified at note to I.R.C. § 1259).
105. See id. § 1001(d)(3) (to be codified at note to I.R.C. § 1259). The special rule
will treat certain appreciated financial positions as income in respect of a decedent
under section 691 of the Code if the following requirements are satisfied: (A) a con-
structive sale of an appreciated financial position occurred on or before June 8, 1997;
(B) the constructive sale transaction remains open, either with respect to the dece-
dent or an individual related to the decedent i) for at least two years after the
transaction is entered into and (ii) for any amount of time during the three year
period preceding the decedent's death; and (C) the position is not closed within thir-
ty days after the enactment of section 1259. See I.R.C. § 475 note.
106. The following criticisms do not necessarily apply to the plain vanilla swaps
and total return equity swaps discussed supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
107. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
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Inequitable Results
Although many might argue to the contrary, the U.S. tax sys-
tem remains grounded in equity.' In addition to raising more
revenue, an important motivation behind a progressive, compre-
hensive tax structure is the creation of a level playing field on
which taxpayers pay their fair share of taxes according to their
various income levels." 9 Logically then, a system concerned
with equality will attempt to create rules and regulations that
uphold the goals of fairness and justice. Section 1259 gives short
shrift to these equitable interests on three distinct fronts.
First, section 1259 appears to address a glaring inequality in
the tax laws: the ability of investors in the top bracket of the tax
scheme to defer and, in some instances, avoid capital gains taxes
by using certain financial products."0 The wealthy seemingly
have more tax deferral and avoidance tools at their disposal
than do the poor. In its present state, however, section 1259 will
lead to a system that is slanted even more in favor of wealthy
investors. Rather than curtailing the abuses practiced by the
Lauders, section 1259 will do more harm than good.
Putting aside the criticisms enumerated above and below, con-
sider the consequences of section 1259 from an equitable front.
Broad treatment of short sales against the box and other finan-
cial instruments will motivate investment banks to create even
more sophisticated financial products.' that are beyond the
108. Cf. Maijorie E. Kornhauser, Equality, Liberty, and a Fair Income Tax, 23
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 619 (1996) (stating that the current tax system addresses
both vertical and horizontal forms of equity). Many people, however, might argue
that a progressive tax system is unfair. See id. at 607-08 (citing critics' calls for a
flat tax or a consumption tax). A progressive system might not be consistent with
the literal definition of fairness used by Representative Dick Armey. that a flat tax
is fair because "[e]veryone should be treated the same." Dick Armey, Review Merits of
Flat Tax, WALL ST. J., June 16, 1994, at A16. But in reality, a normative world al-
lows for "many ways people can be treated the same." Kornhauser, supra, at 613. In
other words, equality is not necessarily a black and white issue but is comprised of
several considerations. See id. at 612 n.10. A discourse on the ideal tax structure for
the United States, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
109. See Kornhauser, supra note 108, at 619 (discussing the goal of vertical equity).
110. See, e.g., supra notes 67-81 and accompanying text.
111. See Deborah L. Paul, Another Uneasy Compromise: The Treatment of Hedging
in a Realization Income Tax, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 45-46 (1996). Section 1259 "could
encourage Wall Street legal specialists to devise new and more sophisticated alterna-
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grasp of the Code and the average investor."' Although equity
swaps already provide fodder for wealthy individuals and insti-
tutions, short sales against the box and options are available to
all investors."' Encouraging the creation of more complex ve-
hicles that require higher commissions" and are available on-
ly to the wealthy will not produce a more equitable tax system.
Instead, the already wide gap between the rich and poor will be
broadened." 5
tives. 'Creative investment bankers may well devise new strategies.' Herman, supra
note 11, at A2 (quoting Robert Willens, Managing Director, Lehman Brothers). Addi-
tionally, compare the financial community's response to the strains placed on the
capital position of domestic and international banking institutions by the globaliza-
tion of the capital markets over the last twenty years. See David Barbour et al.,
Capital Adequacy Concerns: Basle Supervisors Committee, US and UK, in ASSET SE-
CURITIZATION: INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 270, 271 (Joseph
Jude Norton & Paul R. Spelman eds., 1991). In an attempt to meet these capital
strains, substantial innovation has occurred in the form of new financial products,
such as asset securitization. See id. In turn, regulatory agencies have responded
with tighter controls over the new products. See id. Predictably, financial institutions
have "implement[ed] increasingly broader and more sophisticated forms of securitiza-
tion techniques in order to comply with or otherwise minimize these more stringent
regulatory practices." Id. For a thorough description and mechanical explanation of
asset securitization, see Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitiza-
tion: Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEL_ L. REV. 1369 (1991).
112. Cf Tom Herman & Suzanne McGee, How to Cut Your Capital-Gains Tax Bite,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 1997, at C1 (claiming that "as the new law shuts off some ave-
nues, others now look much more attractive").
113. Cf Shefter, supra note 33, at 584 n.10 (stating that "equity swaps have gener-
ally been used less frequently than short against the box transactions by individual
taxpayers," most likely because investors need five to ten million dollars in assets
other than the security being hedged to participate in an equity swap); see also
Henriques & Norris, supra note 14, at Al (discussing a full page advertisement
placed in Barron's magazine by Bankers Trust that solicited investors interested in
entering into equity swaps, but only if the investors had a two million dollar posi-
tion in a single security).
114. Cf Henriques & Norris, supra note 14, at Al (stating that instruments such
as swaps are highly profitable and already generate handsome, continuous fees).
115. An additional concern regards the risks associated with more sophisticated
financial products. Although some might argue that the wealthy would get what
they deserve, regulators should be concerned that the instruments might become so
complex that investors will not be able to understand the risks involved. Consider
the following statement by Robert Citron, former Treasurer of Orange County, Cali-
fornia, and the centerpiece of that County's derivatives fiasco: "In retrospect, ... I
was not the sophisticated treasurer I said I was." Juicy: Orange County, ECONOMIST,
Jan. 21, 1995, at 74. In an era in which derivative instruments already are criti-
cized for their complexity, see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIvA-
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Second, in its attempt to tax short sales against the box, sec-
tion 1259 fails to address the unfair practice of short sellers bor-
rowing shares from related individuals." 6 One of the glaring
inequities of the Est6e Lauder Companies' IPO was the fact that
the Lauders, by borrowing shares from related individuals, put
themselves in a position in which they would never be
squeezed.17 In other words, there was no risk that the stock
would have to be delivered before the borrowers wanted to make
delivery. For example, assume that six months after the IPO, a
tender offer was made for fifty-one percent of the outstanding
shares. Typically, in a situation in which the borrower and lend-
er are not related individuals, the borrower faces the possibility
that the lender will wish to tender his or her shares to the bid-
der. That possibility was unrealistic in the Lauder case because
both the personal relationship between the counterparties and
the fact that the counterparties possessed controlling interests
in the Estee Lauder Companies pressured the related individual
not to tender his or her shares. The result was a perpetual short
sale against the box. Although the Administration sought to tax
such a transaction up front,"' section 1259 does nothing di-
rectly to discourage or prevent this inequity.
Finally, section 1259 falls short with respect to the divide be-
tween wealthy and middle-income investors: a chasm that is
TIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, GAO/GGD-94-133 67
(1994), creating an incentive for investors to delve into more sophisticated products
is irresponsible. Cf William K Maready, Jr., Comment, Regulating for Disaster:
Federal Attempts to Control the Derivatives Market, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 885,
887 (1996) (stating that "further regulation in this area ... is unnecessary and
harmful to a business which provides numerous benefits to businesses, investors, and
the economy").
116. To correspond with the Code, "related individuals" will be defined here as in-
dividuals "in one of the following relationships: (1) husband and wife [or other famil-
ial relationships], (2) grantor and fiduciary, (3) grantor and beneficiary, (4) fiduciary
and beneficiary, legatee, or heir, (5) decedent and decedent's estate, (6) partner[ship],
or (7) member of an affiliated group of corporations." I.R.C. § 1313(c) (1994). For the
purpose of curtailing the abuse accomplished by the Lauders, however, this definition
shall be expanded to include any parties who, when considered together, constitute a
majority shareholder block that controls the voting process in any publicly traded
entity.
117. Conceivably, the Lauders could be squeezed, but such an action seems unlikely
given the Lauders' relationship to the lenders.
118. See Shefter, supra note 33, at 583-84.
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created by the procedures followed by many Wall Street invest-
ment firms. Theoretically, the average investor should be able to
enjoy the same tax benefits that the Lauders are experiencing:
specifically, a perpetual short sale against the box plus retention
of the proceeds from the short against the box transaction. As ex-
plained previously, however, "ordinary investors are not allowed
by their brokers to withdraw the proceeds from their short sales
until they have returned the shares they borrowed.""' Realisti-
cally, therefore, the average investor does not have the incentive
to keep the transaction open perpetually but uses this technique
only to defer taxes temporarily,"O a practice that is both benign
and beneficial to the operation of the capital markets.' 2 '
Recently, however, Wall Street investment houses began
treating their wealthiest clients differently by permitting that
clientele to withdraw up to ninety-five percent 22 of the pro-
ceeds from short sales immediately "in the form of a very inex-
pensive loan."' Here lies another abuse of shorting against
the box: wealthy investors have the ability to lock in their profit
on the underlying security, effectively receive that profit in the
form of a loan, and delay, or in some cases avoid, taxation on the
profit. Section 1259 should rectify, not ignore, this abuse.
Contrary to Longstanding Principles of Tax Law
Further criticisms of section 1259 arise out of the longstand-
ing treatment short sales against the box and other open trans-
actions have received: namely, that realization does not occur
until a transaction is closed" and that the Code should not
place undue burdens on taxpayers.' Despite attacks on the
119. Henriques & Norris, supra note 14, at Al (emphasis added); see Missakian In-
terview, supra note 17; supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
120. See Henriques & Norris, supra note 14, at Al.
121. See infra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
123. Henriques & Norris, supra note 14, at Al; see Missakian Interview, supra
note 17.
124. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
125. See Joshua D. Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance and Income Measurement, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 365, 366 (1988) (stating that "in the American tax system, a person's taxable
income for any year is intended to reflect.., the extent to which Congress believed
that the imposition of tax might impose an undue hardship on the taxpayer").
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realization requirement,2 ' it remains one of the most funda-
mental components of the tax system.'27 Realization derives
from the Supreme Court's holding in Eisner v. Macomber"
that gain must be severed from invested capital.'29 In essence,
the point of Eisner was that an appreciated position should not
result in income under the Sixteenth Amendment 31 unless an
event severs the appreciation, i.e., gain, from the underlying
capital. 31 Although this standard was not intended to define
gross income forever,3 2 its impact can be found in Commis-
sioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 3 3 which determined that for
gain to be part of taxable gross income it must be an "undeni-
able accession[] to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the
taxpayer[ [has] complete dominion."' 3 In the words of Justice
Blackmun:
It long has been established that gain or loss in the value
of property is taken into account for income tax purposes only
if and when the gain or loss is "realized," that is, when it is
tied to a realization event, such as the sale, exchange, or oth-
er disposition of the property. Mere variation in value-the
routine ups and downs of the marketplace-do not in them-
selves have income tax consequences. This is fundamental in
income tax law.3 5
126. See I.R.C. § 475 (1994) (requiring a mark-to-market accounting method for
dealers in securities); id. § 1256 (requiring an end-of-the-year mark-to-market ac-
counting method for contracts consisting of certain financial products).
127. See Loren D. Prescott, Jr., Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner: Re-
fining the Concept of Realization, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 440-41 (1991) (citing 1
BoRis I. BITrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INcoME, EsTATES
AND GIFTS j 5.2, at 5-17 (2d ed. 1989)).
128. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
129. See id. at 207.
130. The Sixteenth Amendment grants Congress the authority to "lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived." U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
131. See Bancker v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 1, 2 (5th Cir. 1935); Prescott, supra
note 127, at 439-40.
132. See Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 468-69 (1940) ("It is not necessary to
recognition of taxable gain that [the taxpayer] should be able to sever the improve-
ment begetting the gain from his original investment."); United States v. Kirby Lum-
ber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931) (holding that the taxpayer realized income when it
repurchased its own bonds for less than par value).
133. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
134. Id. at 431 (emphasis added).
135. Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 569-70 (1991) (Blackmun,
1376
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 1259
Realization thus, according to Justice Blackmun, is "fundamental
in income tax law.""6 The majority opinion in Cottage Savings
seemed to agree with Justice Blackmun: "Rather than assessing
tax liability on the basis of annual fluctuations in the value of a
taxpayer's property, the Internal Revenue Code defers the tax
consequences of a gain or loss in property value until the taxpayer
'realizes' the gain or loss." 13 7 Even the Code agrees: "The gain
from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the excess of
the amount realized therefrom... .""' Although not a constitu-
tional requirement but a rule "founded on administrative conve-
nience,"'39 the realization principle requires that the taxpayer
engage in a sale or disposition of the ownership of the property in
question before gain or loss will be realized.40 Under the real-
ization-based tax system, therefore, two elements apparently
must exist before gain will be realized: (1) a sale or disposition
must occur (2) of property owned by the taxpayer.""
Sale or Disposition
Traditionally, recognition of income occurred when the tax-
payer realized income, not when the taxpayer received the right
to obtain income.' The Supreme Court has relaxed this stan-
dard, however, to the degree that "realization may occur when
the last step is taken by which [the taxpayer] obtains the fru-
ition of the economic gain which has already accrued to
him."' Clearly, a short sale against the box cannot be charac-
terized as a sale accompanied by the receipt of money for income
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
136. Id. at 570 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137. Id. at 559.
138. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
139. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940); see Wilson & Jackman, supra
note 26, at 2216 n.5.
140. See I.R.C. § 1001(b); Wilson & Jackman, supra note 26, at 2213. This require-
ment, however, has proved to be met easily under recent legislation. See, e.g., I.R.C.
§ 475 (requiring a mark-to-market accounting method for dealers in securities); id §
1256 (requiring year-end mark-to-market accounting for any regulated futures con-
tract, foreign currency contract, nonequity option, or dealer equity option).
141. See I.R.C. § 1001(a).
142. See Horst, 311 U.S. at 115.
143. Id.
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tax purposes. Support for this contention lies not only in section
1259's title, which refers to "Constructive Sales,"' but also is
inherent in the transaction itself-the broker, rather than the
taxpayer, retains the proceeds from a short sale against the
box.'45 The question then is whether a short sale against the
box can be deemed a disposition due to the taxpayer's enjoyment
of the benefit of economic gain. Such an event "may occur when
[the taxpayer] has made such use or disposition of his power to
receive or control the income as to procure in its place other
satisfactions which are of economic worth."" 6
A valid argument can be made that a disposition indeed has
occurred: Some taxpayers are able to withdraw loans of up to
ninety-five percent of the proceeds garnered from the short sale
against the box. 47 Although some taxpayers certainly are en-
joying the benefits of economic gain in the form of low-interest
loans from the broker, such is not the case for all taxpayers en-
tering into short sale against the box positions. As argued previ-
ously, not all investors who sell short against the box have the
ability to obtain this inexpensive loan.'48 Rather, only certain
wealthy investors may do so."9 Disposition, therefore, has oc-
curred only with respect to certain investors who receive the
loan. Section 1259, however, unwisely treats all investors as if a
a recognizing event has taken place.
Three Attributes of Tax Ownership
Typically, tax ownership consists of three attributes: "legal
title; possession [ofi the right to use the property or to derive
current incomeU; and the right to subsequent appreciation, as
well as the risk of loss." 50 First, when an investor sells short
144. I.R.C. § 1259 (West Supp. 1997).
145. See Henriques & Norris, supra note 14, at Al; Missakian Interview, supra
note 17; supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
146. Horst, 311 U.S. at 116.
147. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33, 119-20.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33, 122-23.
150. Wilson & Jackman, supra note 26, at 2213; cf. Paul, supra note 111, at 9 (cit-
ing Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1221, 1237-38 (1981)) (list-
ing several factors the courts use to determine whether a sale has occurred).
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against the box, he or she does not relinquish legal title to the
underlying asset even though risk of loss and opportunity for
gain might be limited or eliminated. 5' For example, selling a
security short against the box has no effect on the investor's vot-
ing rights.
152
Second, a short sale against the box does not affect the seller's
right to use the security or derive current income from the securi-
ty. In other words, an investor who sells XYZ stock short against
the box retains control over the stock-he or she still may sell the
stock in the market without closing the transaction so long as he
or she gives property of equal value to the lending broker as col-
lateral.'53 Additionally, the investor retains the right to current
income in the form of any declared dividends."
Last, a case can be made that most investors do retain certain
benefits and burdens of ownership when utilizing short sales
against the box. Although the stock's value is insulated com-
pletely from depreciation and appreciation during the time the
position is held open, the average investor still faces several
risks. First, average investors can be squeezed, an event that
could prevent them from achieving the goal that motivated the
transaction.'55 For example, if the investor seeks protection
from short-term shocks in the market, then that goal is threat-
ened by forcing the investor to close his or her position before
the short-term risks have subsided. Second, investors that enter
into short sales against the box to hedge against short-term
risks expect to be re-exposed to market risks and opportunities
for capital gain at a future date. Such investors, therefore, only
eliminate risk of loss and opportunity for gain temporarily. A
line should be drawn between this practice and that used by the
Lauders in which all benefits and burdens were eliminated in
perpetuity, including the possibility of being squeezed. 5 '
Section 1259 ignores these facts. Furthermore, it comes close
to defining income as the sum of consumption and changes in





156. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
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wealth over a given period of time. In other words, the Glenshaw
Glass definition of income"'7 essentially is abandoned in favor
of a Haig-Simons economic definition of income.158 Consequent-
ly, unrealized and realized appreciation will be taxed,5 9 a re-
sult contrary to established precedent.
Undue Hardship and Lack of Liquidity
In addition to the realization principle, section 1259 violates
another historical concern of the Code: liquidity. Congress's con-
cern with liquidity is evident in its treatment of installment
sales. 6 ' Recognizing the fact that the seller in an installment
contract will not receive the entire payment for the sale in the
current taxable year, Congress granted the seller relief from this
liquidity problem by enacting section 453."s' The investors uti-
lizing short sales against the box suffer from a similar liquidity
problem.'62
Again, consider the average investor who is unable to with-
draw the proceeds from a short sale against the box transac-
tion." Such an investor has no identifiable liquid base from
which to extract capital to finance his or her tax bill resulting
from a constructive sale. True, the argument can be made that
investors dealing in publicly traded securities do not have a li-
157. See supra text accompanying note 134.
158. Economic income is defined by Henry Simons as "the algebraic sum of (1) the
market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of
the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in
question." HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF IN-
COME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938). Robert Haig's definition of income
was similar: "the money-value of the net accretion to economic power between two
points of time." Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal
Aspects, in 9 READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 54, 75 (Richard A.
Musgrave & Carl S. Shoup eds., 1959).
159. See Paul, supra note 111, at 5-6.
160. Generally, "[tihe term 'installment sale' means a disposition of property where
at least [one] payment is to be received after the close of the taxable year in which
the disposition occurs." I.R.C. § 453(b)(1) (1994).
161. Id. § 453; see JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 844-45 (9th ed. 1996).
162. But cf. Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation of Equity Derivatives: A Partial Integration
Proposal, 50 TAX L. REV. 571, 594-95 n.94 (1995) (arguing that liquidity should not be
a major concern when the taxable transaction involves publicly traded securities).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33, 119-21.
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quidity problem because a market exists in which they can sell
the securities very easily."64 This argument, however, is circu-
lar: If the investor were to take advantage of a liquid market
and sell the securities to obtain cash, then no short sale against
the box would occur, and no constructive sale issue would en-
sue."s The fact that publicly traded securities have a liquid
market does not solve the liquidity problem created when selling
short against the box. As Professors Nodl Cunningham and
Deborah Schenk suggested, "[a]ny proposal that would tax in-
come as it accrues rather than when realized should satisfy the
burden of proof with respect to... liquidity."66 Section 1259
falls short of meeting this burden.67
Adverse Impact on Legitimate Investment Decisions
Supporters of section 1259 claim that "[a] short sale against
the box is a tax deferral transaction, nothing more."'68 John
Buckley, Minority Tax Counsel to the House Ways and Means
Committee, voiced this opinion when he stated: "A senior mem-
ber asked me why we permit short sales against the box. I
couldn't think of any economic reason for it."'69
Although tax deferral is a major, and perhaps primary, con-
cern of investors who sell short against the box, deferral is not
as dubious or isolated a motivation as these commentators sug-
gest. 7 ° Often, investors sell short against the box to hedge an
investment without incurring any tax liability until some future
164. See Schenk, supra note 162, at 594-95 n.94.
165. Furthermore, in the case of an investor hedging against short-term risk in a
stock with long-term growth potential, such a liquidity argument defeats the goal of
the transaction.
166. Nodl B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without Realization: A
"Revolutionary" Approach to Ownership, 47 TAX L. REV. 725, 742-43 (1992).
167. The truth of this statement is highlighted by the fact that the Administration
did not address the liquidity problem in its proposed legislation. See supra notes 82-
84 and accompanying text.
168. Lee A. Sheppard, Fixes to Ensure that Tax Is Paid on Capital Gains, 69 TAx
NOTES 1165, 1166 (1995).
169. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 498 (quoting John Buckley, Minority Tax Council
to the House Ways and Means Committee).
170. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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date.'7' For several reasons, investors wish to maintain owner-
ship of their investment and thereby delay realization. On the
one hand, a questionable motive such as the possibility of tax
avoidance drives some investors with large concentrated equity
positions to enter into a short sale against the box transac-
tion.7 2 On the other hand, benign reasoning such as deferring
gains or losses from one time period to the next 73 or seeking
short-term protection for equity positions that have long-term
prospects motivates investors to sell short against the box. 74
Read in its entirety, section 1259 prevents deferral.'75 The ex-
ception created for certain transactions found in section
1259(c)(3)'76 limits the goal that the exception was intended to
achieve: To permit the use of short selling against the box as a
short-term hedging technique.'77 The existence of a benign mo-
tivation such as hedging requires a more specific treatment of
the abusive practices that can be invoked when selling short
against the box.
First, granting an investor the ability to maintain some con-
trol over the time period in which a capital gain or loss is real-
ized functions as a risk premium to compensate the investor for
investing his savings in the capital markets. 7 ' In other words,
flexibility in the tax system is necessary to attract capital in-
vestment. Preventing an investor from delaying realization
might result in reduced cash flows into the capital markets and
thereby increase market volatility. Additionally, giving investors
the latitude to choose the period in which they will realize their
171. See infra text accompanying notes 182-86.
172. The Lauder transaction appears to exemplify this motivation-a motivation
that should concern the Administration.
173. See Evans et al., supra note 14, 39. The key word here is "defer." Merely
deferring realization should not be an issue because tax liability will result in the
future. Rather, the concern should be over perpetual deferral and ultimately tax
avoidance under section 1014.
174. See id. 17-20.
175. This point should be obvious. Section 1259, by treating short sale against the
box and other positions as constructive sales, creates a scheme of current recognition.
176. I.R.C. § 1259(c)(3) (West Supp. 1997).
177. The limits created by the new law are discussed infra text accompanying
notes 187-95.
178. Cf Evans et al., supra note 14, 1 39 (discussing the need for favorable tax
provisions to offset the market risk associated with securities investment).
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tax liability helps to bridge the gap between ordinary individual
investors and institutional investors."9 Institutional investors
generally possess tremendous advantages over individual inves-
tors, especially with respect to financial resources and size.8 '
Allowing investors to maintain control over the timing of realiza-
tion levels the playing field slightly because an additional incen-
tive would be created for individuals to enter the capital mar-
kets alongside institutions. 8' Section 1259, therefore, would
function as a barrier to entry for individuals who do not have
comparable capital reserves. Such a result is inequitable and
inefficient.
Second, selling short against the box allows investors to pro-
tect securities with long-term upside potential from short-term
risks.82 For example, an investor might hold a stock that he
believes has great long-term value. The investor also might be
concerned that the stock faces a possible fall in value over the
short-term."'s To protect his investment, the investor can sell
the stock in question short against the box. By so doing, the
position is protected against a short-term drop in value-any loss
in the value of the shares owned by the investor is recovered
from the short sale.' After the investor believes the short-
term risk has passed, he then can purchase shares in the mar-
ket with the proceeds from the short sale and deliver those
shares to the lender to close out the transaction. 85 Through-
out, the investor keeps the shares in the box, i.e., the long posi-
tion, without affecting their holding period or basis.'86 Section




182. See id. % 17.
183. Consider a software manufacturer such as Microsoft. Microsoft might have
great prospects because of the continued growth of the software industry. At the
same time, the value of Microsofts stock might be threatened in the short-term be-
cause a competitor plans to release a new product that will compete directly with
software marketed by Microsoft. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. In other words, short selling against the box can be viewed as latent fuel for
capital market appreciation and cushioning for market depreciation because of the
fact that the borrowed stock must be repurchased except in abusive cases. See
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1259(c)(3) recognizes the positive hedging attributes of short
selling against the box by creating an exception from construc-
tive sale treatment for certain closed transactions, but the stan-
dard used is far too inflexible. The new law will emasculate this
hedging strategy even though there is neither a similarity to the
Lauder transaction nor a motive to cheat the tax system.187
To keep the taxpayer's long position exempt from constructive
sale treatment, the new law requires that taxpayers close the
short position with respect to the same or substantially identical
security no later than January 30th following the taxable year
in which the taxpayer entered into the short against the box
transaction." Section 1259 also requires that the taxpayer
hold the long position at risk. 9 for at least sixty days following
the date on which the taxpayer closes the short against the box
Missakian Interview, supra note 17.
187. For a further discussion on the mechanics involved in this transaction, see
Evans et al., supra note 14, 17. Supporters of section 1259 might argue that other
methods are available by which an investor can hedge against short-term risks,
namely selling and repurchasing the stock or purchasing a put option. Cf id. 18
(noting that section 1259 will force taxpayers to purchase put options to eliminate
downside risk). Although both of these alternatives protect the investor's short-term
position, neither is acceptable. Selling and repurchasing the stock destroys the inves-
tor's holding period and affects basis. Cf id. 1% 17-18 (noting that short sales
against the box preserve the taxpayer's holding period and basis). As discussed in
this Note, the resulting tax liability is not the proper means for addressing the
abuses associated with short selling against the box. See infra notes 207-32 and ac-
companying text (providing an alternative approach to these abuses).
188. See I.R.C. § 1259(c)(3)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1997). Note that the taxpayer can
close the position in one of two ways: Either by delivering the shares already owned
or by purchasing shares in the market. See 1997 TAX FACTS 2: ON INVESTMENTS, su-
pra note 23, at 14. The former option, however, is improbable if the investor is
hedging against short-term risk because he will want to maintain the long position.
See RUBIN & GAMBARO, supra note 24, at 154.
189. By requiring that the taxpayer remain at risk during the sixty-day period, the
exemption prevents the taxpayer from entering into another short against the box
position until after the sixty-day period has expired. Clearly, section 1259 allows the
taxpayer to open a second short against the box transaction regarding the same or a
substantially identical security during the sixty-day "at risk" period. See I.R.C. §
1259(c)(3)(B). By doing so, however, the second transaction must meet the section's
requirements, i.e., the second transaction, or the third or fourth, etc., must be closed
out within thirty days after the end of the taxable year and must be held at risk
for sixty days. See id. The eventual impact upon the taxpayer, therefore, is that he
must refrain from entering into a short against the box position until after the six-
ty-day "at risk" period relating to the final transaction ends.
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transaction. 9 ' For example, assume a taxpayer enters into a
short against the box transaction on October 30, 1997. Under
the new law, the position must be closed by January 30, 1998, to
prevent it from being characterized as a constructive sale of the
taxpayer's long position. Once the taxpayer closes the short posi-
tion, e.g., on January 30, 1998, he or she must hold the long po-
sition at risk, i.e., without entering into another short against
the box, at least until the end of the day on March 31, 1998. On
April 1, 1998, the taxpayer could then open another short
against the box position using the same security. That position,
for purposes of complying with section 1259, need not be closed
until January 30, 1999. The taxpayer motivated by short-term
hedging, therefore, may hedge his or her long position for no
more than thirteen months at a time. Given the fact that such
an investment strategy is unrelated to the abusive nature of the
Estde Lauder Companies' IPO, this limit placed on the
taxpayer's hedging strategy is troubling for two reasons.
First, the exclusion does not provide much relief for investors
who discover short-term risks late in the taxable year. For ex-
ample, consider an investor who determines on November 1,
1997, that a stock in which he or she is long is susceptible to a
short-term risk of loss caused by competition in the industry.
Previously, the investor could establish a short against the box
position that he or she could maintain until the risk passed,
whether that time period be two months or two years. Under
section 1259, however, the investor, among other things, must
close the position no later than January 30 of the taxable year
following the year in which the security was purchased. 9' In
the hypothetical, the investor must close the short position ap-
proximately three months after it was opened. According to the
new law, the investor, after holding the long position at risk for
sixty days, could re-establish the short against the box. 9 In
other words, the investor, after discovering a short-term risk on
November 1, 1997, can hedge until January 30, 1998, without
suffering adverse tax consequences. After remaining at risk until
190. See I.R.C. § 1259(c)(3)(A)(ii)-(iii).
191. See i. § 1259(c)(3)(A)(i).
192. See id. § 1259(c)(3)(A)(fi)-(ii).
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April 1, 1998, which the investor clearly will be if the estimated
short-term risk continues to exist, the investor can enter into
another short against the box position.' 91 Certainly, this result
is neither overly sympathetic nor helpful to investors facing
short-term risks.
Second, section 1259's exclusionary language places too low of
a ceiling on the amount of time investors can hedge against
short-term risks. Assuming the investor enters into a short
against the box position on January 1, the new legislation cre-
ates a thirteen month, uninterrupted maximum hedging peri-
od.' 94 Such a standard is too inflexible to be helpful to inves-
tors facing short-term risks of varying length. The problem is
that the short-term risk to which the investor's stock is exposed
might not pass for six months, twelve months, or twenty-four
months. An investor, therefore, who is fortunate enough to es-
tablish the hedge at the earliest point of the year, January 1,
and whose long position faces an eighteen month short-term
risk, will be able to remain short against the box with respect to
the stock at risk for only sixteen of the eighteen risk-related
months.' 9' This limit on the time that investors may hedge,
combined with the unpredictability of the date on which the
short-term risk will be discovered, makes section 1259 an inflex-
ible and unfocused law considering the abusive practice it sup-
posedly targets.
SOME ALTERNATiVE SUGGESTIONS
Section 1259 is flawed. Specifically, it fails to correct directly
the abuses of short selling against the box. Although section
193. Note that the hypothetical also applies to investors who discover short-term
risks before and after November 1 of the taxable year. The crux of the problem is
that short-term risks do not fall conveniently on certain dates. The utility of section
1259(c)(3) would be much higher if the Code could act as a Farmer's Almanac and
accurately predict that all short-term risks confronting securities would occur on Jan-
uary 1 thereby giving investors thirteen months of uninterrupted hedging bliss. Be-
cause such a prediction is not the case, the new law at least should be flexible
enough to accommodate for the unpredictability of short-term risks.
194. See I.R.C. § 1259(c)(3)(A)(i).
195. The investor could close his short position on January 30 of the following
year, remain at risk for two months, and then establish another short against the
box position on April 1 for the final three months of the eighteen-month risk period.
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1259 will result in the taxation of capital gains arising from con-
structive sales, thereby closing the short against the box loop-
hole directly and the interrelation between that loophole and the
death loophole indirectly, it does nothing to prohibit short sellers
from borrowing securities from related individuals. Section 1259
is, therefore, ineffective.19 The question remains whether a
precise mechanism exists for eliminating abuses without creat-
ing an inequitable result that is contrary to longstanding tax
doctrine and hostile to legitimate investment decisions.
One option is to take section 1259 one step further and create
a complete mark-to-market or accrual tax regime. Under such a
system, a Haig-Simons definition of income197 would be used
and realized and unrealized appreciation alike would be taxed.
Although a few commentators argue that this type of system
would be ideal, 9 ' others claim that this system is a direction
in which the Code should not travel.'99 Similar to section 1259,
a mark-to-market or accrual system raises concerns over liquidi-
ty.211 In other words, investors would be taxed on nonliquid,
paper gains rather than capital gains that are liquid. As argued
previously, the tax system should continue to postpone taxation
of gains until realization to prevent taxpayers from being unduly
burdened with concerns over liquidity.
20
'
Additionally, some commentators, including Treasury officials,
suggested the possibility of introducing safe harbors into section
1259 before it was passed into law.2 2 The New York State Bar
Association also recommended that section 1259 contain a provi-
sion giving the regulating body the power to exclude transac-
196. Apparently, preventing short sellers from borrowing securities from related
individuals was never a target of section 1259; rather, Congress focused on prevent-
ing multi-year tax deferrals and short against the box transactions that straddled
two tax years to defer recognition of capital gains. See Paul, supra note 3, at 1474.
197. See supra note 158.
198. See Paul, supra note 111, at 6.
199. See Evans et al., supra note 14, 91 4 (stating that section 1259 is a step to-
ward a mark-to-market regime and thus a step in the wrong direction).
200. See Missakian Interview, supra note 17.
201. See supra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
202. See Chris McCarter, Short-Against-The-Box Proposal May Include Safe Harbors,
Officials Say, [19961 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) G-12, G-13 (May 13, 1996); Richard L.
Reinhold, NYSBA Analyzes Short-Against-The-Box Legislation, TAx NOTEs TODAY 46-
35, Mar. 6, 1996, pt. HI.E.3, at 15-16, available in WESTLAW, TNT Database.
13871998]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1355
tions that are not abusive. °3  Neither safe harbors nor
exclusionary language, however, will correct section 1259's indi-
rect treatment of the abusive nature of short selling against the
box while also ensuring that no inequitable result contrary to
longstanding tax policy occurs. Although these options each have
glimpses of merit, none addresses the abuses typified by the
Lauders without correspondingly detrimental effects to the capi-
tal markets or the economy.
The rule proposed by this Note originated with the following
argument by L.G. "Chip" Harter, a partner of Baker & McKenzie
in Washington, D.C.: "If there is consensus that the aggressive
use of 'short against the box' techniques in estate planning must
be curbed, it would be preferable to directly address the issue of
stepping up the basis of hedged positions on the death of the
holder."" 4 Basically, Harter posited that short against the box
abuses can be corrected narrowly by not allowing the cost basis
of securities to be stepped-up to fair market value upon the
death of the short seller "if the [short seller's] risk of ownership
had been 'substantially eliminated' for more than one-half of the
three-year period immediately preceding the [short seller's]
death."20 5
Harter is correct: a proposal must be drafted that corrects nar-
rowly for the abuses that occur when short sales against the box
are used as aggressive estate planning devices. Although Harter's
proposal presents an appropriate framework upon which to build,
the proposal is ineffective because it relies on ambiguous lan-
guage. Specifically, Harter would disallow a step-up in basis if the
risks of owning the stock were "substantially eliminated" for more
than one and one-half years of the three-year period prior to the
death of the short seller.0 6 The problem is that the "substantial-
ly eliminated" language is not defined. Such ambiguity only can
complicate further a Code that already is far too complex. The next
section of this Note presents a narrowly tailored solution to correct
for the abuses perfected by the Lauders.
203. See Reinhold, supra note 202, pt. I, at 5.
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CONSTRUCTING A NEW PARADIGM
The three principal abuses with which regulators should con-
cern themselves are the following: (1) the unlikelihood that the
Lauders could ever be squeezed, i.e., the ability of short sellers
to borrow from relatives, especially relatives who control the
company that issued the stock sold short against the box; (2) the
presumption that the Lauders were able to obtain the proceeds
from the short against the box transaction; and (3) the conjunc-
tive use of Revenue Ruling 72-4782o7 and section 1014 of the
Code.08 In other words, Congress should have tailored section
1259 narrowly to curtail the aggressive estate planning practice
used by the Lauders: the creation of a perpetual short sale
against the box.209 Contrary to the opinion of the Treasury,210
this goal is achievable.
The Related Individual-Income with Respect to a Decedent Rule
Arms' Length Requirement
Presently, investors may borrow stock from any counterparty
for the purpose of effecting a short sale against the box.21' As a
result, these investors face no legitimate threat of being
squeezed because of their relationship to the lender.2"2 To the
contrary, typical investors213 are exposed to this counterparty
207. Rev. Rul. 72-478, 1972-2 C.B. 487.
208. I.R.C. § 1014 (1994).
209. See Harter, supra note 14, at S-123, S-127. In other words:
While proposed § 1259 has been characterized as a response to the use
of "short against the box" transactions in the estate planning context, the
proposed legislation amounts to nothing less than a sweeping departure
from realization-based tax accounting for most financial instruments. The
proposal thus appears to be a keystone in the Treasury's plans to "re-
engineer" the taxation of financial instruments rather than a targeted
anti-abuse provision.
Id. at S-123.
210. See McCarter, supra note 202, at G-12 (quoting Treasury official David
Weisbach as saying 'ithis is the narrowest approach we could have taken").
211. See supra text accompanying note 116.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.
213. Most investors who sell short against the box would seem to fall into this category.
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demand risk.214 Legislation must be crafted in such a manner,
therefore, that prevents investors from entering into short sales
against the box transactions in which there is no threat of being
squeezed by the lender. By so doing, all investors will be placed
in a more equitable position with respect to the risks inherent in
a short against the box position. Congress can achieve this re-
sult in a straight-forward way: Creating a rule that prohibits
investors from borrowing securities from related individuals for
the purpose of entering into a short sale against the box.
For example, consider the arm's length requirement of section
23B of the Federal Reserve Act215 that prevents member banks
and their affiliates from entering into certain transactions un-
less they do so "on terms and under circumstances... that are
substantially the same, or at least as favorable to such bank or
its subsidiary, as those prevailing at the time for comparable
transactions with or involving other nonaffiliated compa-
nies." "' In other words, a member bank or affiliate cannot
engage in transactions more favorable than comparable transac-
tions with nonaffiliate banks. A purpose of this arm's length
provision "is to keep companies affiliated with banks or thrifts
from using their access to federally insured deposits to compete
unfairly with companies not so affiliated."1 7
A similar rule can be incorporated here. Investors may engage
in short sale against the box transactions only on terms and
under circumstances that are substantially the same or at least
as favorable to the short seller and related individual lender as
those prevailing at the time for short sale against the box trans-
actions between the short seller and other non-related lenders.
Put differently, "[t]ransactions involving related parties cannot
be presumed to be carried out on an arm's-length basis, as the
requisite conditions of competitive free-market dealings may not
214. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.
215. 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1 (1994).
216. 12 U.S.C. § 371c-l(a)(1)(A). A good faith provision also exists for situations in
which there are no comparable transactions, see id. § 371c-l(a)(1)(B), but that sub-
section is not relevant here.
217. Lee S. Adams & Bruce Rigelman, The New Business of Banking: What Banks
Can Do Now, in THE NEW BUSINESS OF BANKING: WHAT BANKS CAN Do Now 361,
363 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-884, 1995).
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exist." '2 18 Because related individuals probably will never
squeeze the short seller, this provision can be stated more suc-
cinctly: Investors may not engage in short sale against the box
transactions with related individuals.21 9 Under such a rule, all
investors will be treated equally with respect to counterparty
demand risks.
Withdrawal of Proceeds
In recent years, wealthy investors had the opportunity to
withdraw the proceeds from short sales against the box transac-
tions in the form of low-interest loans."' Presumably, the
Lauders opted for this tactic when they sold their shares of
Est6e Lauder Companies short against the box. This question-
able practice constitutes an abuse of the Code's allowance of
short against the box transactions because of its similarity to a
sale of the underlying stock. Note, however, that not all inves-
tors have the ability to obtain this loan.22' As a result, a law
such as section 1259 ensnares investors who are not abusing the
hedging technique because they are not receiving the proceeds of
the short sale. Section 1259 penalizes these average, nonabusive
investors rather than the atypical investors who, as a result of
their acquisition of the proceeds, are sufficiently liquid to absorb
the tax liability created under section 1259.
The paradoxical situation created by section 1259 can be recti-
fied by crafting a more narrow rule of law. For example, Con-
gress could fashion a law that levies a tax only on investors who
actually receive the proceeds from the transaction. It also could
enact legislation that prohibits all investors from obtaining the
proceeds from a short sale against the box. Although presenting
less of an opportunity to raise revenue, the latter alternative
should be preferred over the former because the latter strikes at
the heart of the abuse: The ability of particular investors to
218. RELATED PARTY DISCLOSURES, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STAN-
DARDS No. 57, § 3 (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. ed., 1982).
219. See supra note 116 for a proposed definition of related individuals; cf Evans
et al., supra note 14, 25 (supporting a rule that would prohibit short sellers from
borrowing shares from related parties).
220. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
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withdraw proceeds while others cannot.
Treat Open Positions as Income in Respect of a Decedent
Finally, the Est6e Lauder Companies' IPO demonstrated that
short sales against the box can be abusive when used in conjunc-
tion with section 1014 of the Code. As stated previously, section
1014 allows for a security to be passed on by way of death at a
step-up in basis.222 The death escape clause, therefore, allows
an investor to sell an appreciated stock short against the box,
leave the transaction open until he or she dies, and pass on the
underlying stock at a step-up in basis-one equal to the stock's
fair market value at the time of death.22 In such a case "no
gain would be realized because the basis in the shares delivered
[to close the short position] would have been stepped up to fair
market value on the death of the shareholders."" Such a re-
sult clearly is an abuse that was never anticipated by the Code.
Section 1259 will prevent this practice because the capital gain
will be taxed when the short sale against the box is opened.2"
A narrower correction can be made, however, without the side
effects that accompany Congress's solution.
Recall the suggestion made by Chip Harter to disallow a step-
up in basis if the risks of ownership of a particular stock were
substantially eliminated for more than one and one-half years of
the three years prior to the death of the short seller.226 With
the exception of the "substantially eliminated" language, the
idea behind this proposal is valid.227 In other words, if the
"substantially eliminated" language were omitted, and other
minor alterations were made, then the proposal becomes nar-
rower and corrects for the abuse in a straight-forward manner.
For example, Congress could create a rule that requires treat-
ment of proceeds from an open transaction such as a short sale
against the box when the proceeds are passed on by way of
222. See supra note 75.
223. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
224. Harter, supra note 14, at S-122.
225. See I.R.C. § 1259(a)(1), (c)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1997).
226. See supra text accompanying notes 205-06.
227. See supra text accompanying note 206.
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death as income in respect of a decedent pursuant to section
691 of the Code.' In other words, no step-up in basis will
occur, and any gains will be included in the gross income of
either the estate of the decedent or any person who acquires
the right to receive such income from the decedent. 9 Section
1259 takes a step in this direction but falls short because it ef-
fectively grants section 691 treatment only to constructive sales
that are entered into before June 9, 1997."' Specifically,
gains on appreciated financial positions will be treated as in-
come in respect of a decedent under section 691 if the following
events occur: (1) the decedent dies after June 8, 1997; (2) the
decedent entered into a constructive sale prior to that effective
date; (3) the constructive sale transaction remains open (a) for
at least two years following the date of the transaction and (b)
for any amount of time during the three-year period which
ends on the date the decedent dies; and (4) the transaction
remains open after the thirty-day period beginning on the date
of enactment of section 1259."l The problem with this ap-
proach is its underinclusiveness. Section 691 treatment does
not apply to constructive sales occurring after June 8, 1997;
rather, taxpayers must close those transactions within thirty
days after the end of the taxable year and hold the appreciated
position, without reducing risk of loss by entering into offset-
ting positions, for a sixty-day period beginning on the date on
which the taxpayer closes the position to avoid constructive
sale treatment and thus recognition of capital gain. 2
228. See I.R.C. § 691 (1994). Some commentators have argued that a rule prevent-
ing short sellers from borrowing from related individuals would correct for all the
abuses contained in the Lauder transaction and thus an additional rule closing the
death loophole for short sellers against the box would be unnecessary. See Evans et
al., supra note 14, 25. Practically, these commentators might be correct, but theo-
retically investors still could use the death loophole in conjunction with I.R.C. §
1233, albeit with more difficulty.
229. See I.R.C. § 691(a)(1)CA)-(C).
230. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1001(d)(3), 111 Stat.
788, 908 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 1259 note).
231. See id.
232. See I.R.C. § 1259(c)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1997).
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CONCLUSION
Regulators have decried short selling, especially in periods of
market decline, as a questionable trading practice in need of
constant restraint. In the past, however, attempts to regulate
short sales focused on their supposed vices."3 Section 1259 de-
parts from this approach. Congress enacted section 1259 to curb
the use of short sales against the box as a means to abuse the
tax system by perpetually deferring-avoiding-:-the payment of
taxes on appreciated long positions. Congress, however, has
made a law that extends beyond the mere elimination of a
taxpayer's ability to use short sales against the box to avoid tax-
es. Congress thus appears less concerned with the potential
abuses of short selling against the box than with taking advan-
tage of populist rhetoric by masking a revenue raiser as an at-
tack on a publicly criticized trading practice. As demonstrated in
this Note, such a plan is unwise.
First, rather than leveling the playing field for all taxpayers,
section 1259 creates a more inequitable tax system. True, equity
may result in the short-run, but the likelihood that more com-
plex financial instruments will be invented to open new tax loop-
holes will lead to long-term inequity.
Second, section 1259's attempt to recognize realization before
a capital asset is disposed of is an affront to longstanding tax
doctrine. Although the Code possesses other constructive rules,
the creation of yet another such rule is not prudent. To label
something constructive is, in effect, an admission that the thing
did not occur. More importantly, Supreme Court precedent re-
233. An obvious example is the uptick rule that was invented after the stock mar-
ket crash of 1929. See Macey et al., supra note 5, at 801. In response to "bear
runs," a domino effect where multitudes of investors sell their positions and thereby
drive the market down, government regulators created a rule that would prevent
short selling from instigating or exacerbating such movements. See id. at 802-04. For
further discussion on the history of the uptick rule and short selling's role in the
crash of 1929, see FRED R. MACAULAY & DAVID DURAND, SHORT SELLING ON THE
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE vi-vii (1951). The uptick rule stipulates that investors
shall be allowed to sell short only if the price at which the short is made is greater
than the previously traded price. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1 (1997); SEC Rule 10a-1,
reprinted in NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE GUIDE %1 2440B, Rule 440B, at 3783-86
(1994). Hence, an investor can only sell short on an uptick or zero uptick. See
Missakian Interview, supra note 17.
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garding the occurrence of realization suggests that the
Administration's change in recognizing when realization takes
place is improper. For these reasons, section 1259 is not a wise
provision.
Third, section 1259(c)(3)'s inflexible nature will prevent inves-
tors from adequately hedging against short-term risks. Hedging
is a benign practice unrelated to the abusive use to which the
Lauders put their short sale against the box transactions. As a
result, the new law overreaches the abuse with which it should
be concerned and places severe limits on a legitimate trading
strategy.
This Note demonstrated that the present tax system, as
amended by section 1259, is unacceptable. Additionally, alterna-
tives such as an accrual tax system or adding safe harbors to
section 1259 are not wise."' Rather, legislation that directly
addresses the abuses of short selling against the box should be
enacted. Instead of reaching through the revenue raising curtain
and grasping at shadows-as section 1259 does-the Related
Individual-Income with Respect to A Decedent Rule proposed in
this Note narrowly and properly will correct short sale against
the box abuses.
Simon D. Ulcickas
234. Other alternatives exist, e.g., eliminating the capital gains tax entirely, but
similar to the alternatives discussed previously, such a solution does not focus specif-
ically on the abuses in question.
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